state spending on EITC refunds counts toward satisfying the TANF maintenanceof-effort requirement (Schott et al., 1999) .
In this essay, I investigate what is known about state responses to the set of fiscal incentives presented by the various welfare programs. These fiscal incentives must be considered as a package, because of the opportunities and pressures for substitution between programs. Recipients of cash assistance are automatically eligible for both Food Stamps and Medicaid, and the overlap in coverage between these programs is substantial. States have a direct fiscal incentive to substitute federal Food Stamps for cash assistance. Rapid increases in the underlying cost of medical services, combined with federal mandates to expand coverage, could cause Medicaid to crowd out cash assistance and other social services. Do states ignore these substitution opportunities and respond to federal matching incentives by increasing their own spending on the matched programs, according to the traditional theory of grants-in-aid, or do they exploit the array of fiscal opportunities to substitute federal for state program dollars? How do mandates interact with financial incentives in determining state spending decisions?
As a first cut at these questions, it is instructive to look at aggregate trends in state welfare spending.
1 If the state share of total welfare spending or states' own fiscal effort for welfare has diminished sharply, this would suggest that the dominant effect has been for federal grants to displace state spending. If state welfare spending has maintained or even increased its relative position, this would suggest that federal incentives and mandates have been relatively effective at inducing fiscal cooperation.
As shown in the first column of Table  1 , cash assistance as a share of total expenditures fell from 3.3 percent in 1980 to 2.2 percent in 1995. It is particularly notable that cash assistance declined as a share of the budget between 1990 and 1995, despite a sharp increase in the number of recipients. In contrast to cash assistance, total state and local welfare expenditures grew as a share of state and local expenditures, from 10.5 percent in 1980 to 14.3 percent in 1995. The increase was particularly pronounced in the 1990s, increasing from 11.3 to 14.3 percent. Welfare expenditures also grew as a share of ownsource revenues, particularly between 1990 and 1995. The increase in total statelocal welfare spending is due primarily to the rapid growth in Medicaid. 
PREVIOUS ESTIMATES OF MATCHING-RATE PRICE EFFECTS
Aid to Families with Dependent Children was financed through an openended matching grant, with the matching rate the same as that for Medicaid. Under the matching formula, the federal share varies inversely with a state's relative income, with a minimum of 50 percent and a maximum of 80 percent. Many studies have attempted to explain variation across states and over time in AFDC benefit levels, caseloads, and total spending. In these studies, AFDC benefits and total expenditures are assumed to depend on state income, the federal matching rate, demographic factors, and, in some models, other welfare programs and benefit levels in neighboring states.
The major studies have been summarized in several review papers (Chernick, 1998; Ribar and Wilhelm, 1999) . There is considerable variation in the estimated elasticities. The price elasticity is 0.5 or greater for recipients and total spending in Baicker's analysis (Baicker, 1999b) for the period 1948-63, is about 0.67 in the Gramlich and Laren analysis of benefit levels (1984), and is similarly large for the Craig and Inman (1986) long-run results for total welfare expenditures. In a classic study using data from the 1960s, Orr found a price elasticity of 0.23. By contrast, price elasticities are found to be small or statistically insignificant, and sometimes positive, in Moffitt (1990) and Ribar and Wilhelm (1999) . When the state share (one minus the federal matching rate) is included as a separate variable in an AFDC benefit equation estimated for the 1980s and 1990s, the coefficient is frequently positive (Schroder, 1995) .
In a careful replication of most of the AFDC benefit level studies, Ribar and Wilhelm (1999) conclude not only that matching rate effects are small, but also that, controlling for unobserved characteristics of states through state fixed effects and common national trends through year dummies, income elasticities are substantially less than unity. Chernick (1999a) re-estimates the Gramlich-Laren model for the period 1984-95, using the full sample of states rather than the restricted sample used in their original study. This re-estimation yields substantially lower price elasticities than in the earlier period and higher income elasticities. Price effects are statistically significant only when the dependent variable includes Food Stamps. In general, re-estimation supports the conclusion of Ribar and Wilhelm that price effects are small in the 1980s and 1990s. Higher benefit levels lead to a higher number of recipients (Blank, 1997) . If federal matching rates do raise benefit levels, then matching should have a bigger effect on total spending than on benefit levels alone. While studies using data from earlier periods (Gramlich and Laren, 1984; Craig and Inman, 1986; Baicker, 1999b) support this expectation, more recent evidence does not. For example, Moffitt et al. (1998) find that the elasticity of AFDC expenditures with respect to the state share is -0.1, while Craig (1993) finds no effect of matching grants on AFDC expenditures.
Thus, the major conclusion from recent studies is that the fiscal impact of matching grants for cash assistance is negligible, suggesting that even very deep price subsidies are incapable of eliciting an expansion in cash transfers to low-income families. The policy implication is that, despite the 150 percent increase in price implied by the conversion to block grants, the effect on benefit levels and welfare spending would be at most a decline of 15 percent, with a strong possibility of zero effect.
2 Given the differences in matching rates, the decline would be smaller in rich states (at most about 10 percent) than in poorer states (at most 35 percent).
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE APPARENT DECLINE IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MATCHING GRANTS
The small matching rate results are quite remarkable, since historical analyses (Wallis and Oates, 1997; Baicker, 1999a) suggest that matching grants played a crucial role in expanding state commitments to assist the needy. What explains the apparent decline in the effectiveness of matching grants? One possibility is that the true price effect is larger, but cannot be statistically identified, due to the high correlation between the AFDC matching rate and state income. With correlations between price and income as high as 0.7, a positive income effect could have a substantial influence in lowering the estimated price elasticity (Chernick and McGuire, 1999) . However, since estimates of the income effect have also been falling over time, the correlation argument is probably not a sufficient explanation for the low price effects.
A second explanation for the declining price effects stems from the interaction between the Food Stamp program and the programs of cash assistance. The maximum Food Stamp benefit in 1996 was $397 for a household of four, equal to 82 percent of the maximum cash benefit. If legislators view Food Stamps as a close substitute for cash, then states have a fiscal incentive to let cash assistance erode over time, allowing (indexed) federal Food Stamp dollars to substitute for state dollars. The incentive for displacement is heightened by the fact that Food Stamps imposes an implicit tax on cash assistance, because benefits are reduced by 30 cents for each additional dollar of cash benefits provided by the states. This tax implies that the cost of raising total cash benefits by a dollar is $1.43 or more.
4 Under AFDC, states bore about 40 percent of this cost, while under TANF, they bear the full cost. If significant, the displacement effect of Food Stamps could have a pronounced effect on the fiscal effectiveness of matching subsidies for cash assistance. As is the case for estimates of the matching rate effect, previous literature presents a very substantial range in estimates of Food Stamp displacement of cash benefits. Some studies find a dollar for dollar offset of AFDC benefits for Food Stamps (Orr, 1976; Moffitt, 1990) , while other studies find that Food Stamps are mainly additive to welfare benefits (Gramlich, 1982; Plotnick, 1986) . In my review (Chernick, 1998) , I noted a tendency for estimates of the Food Stamp substitution effect to increase over time. However, studies that find substantial substitution but also consider other categories of state spending (Craig, 1993) find that Food Stamp dollars are not simply used for general fiscal relief to state budgets. Instead, of the savings in cash benefits that states realize by substituting Food Stamps, a disproportionate share appears to remain within the broader welfare category in state budgets.
The difficulty in determining the Food Stamp displacement effects is that Food Stamps is a uniform national program, with little variation across states. Food Stamps was first introduced in 1974, and earlier studies exploited differences in take-up rates across states, but by the 1980s, coverage was 80 percent or higher for AFDC recipients. An alternative approach was developed by Moffitt (1990) , who uses coefficients from a model of AFDC benefit levels estimated with 1960 data, before the establishment of the Food Stamp and Medicaid programs, to predict AFDC benefits in 1984. Predicted benefits are then compared with the actual AFDC, Food Stamp, and Medicaid benefits. Moffitt finds that predicted benefits are very close to actual benefits in the three programs. From this result, Moffitt concludes that both Food Stamps and Medicaid are treated by voters as perfect substitutes for cash benefits, with a one dollar increase in either inducing close to a dollar decrease in AFDC. In a replication of the Moffitt model for 1993, I find that, while the 1960 model overpredicts the sum of AFDC and Food Stamp benefits, it now underpredicts combined benefits from AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid by about 20 percent (Chernick, 1999a) . This result suggests that the rate of substitution of Food Stamps and Medicaid for AFDC was less than one for one in the period from 1984 to 1993.
In a recent study, I suggest an alternative to the income-matching rate correlation explanation for the decline in estimated AFDC matching rate effects (Chernick, 1999b) . I show that the Food Stamp program actually imposes a higher price on cash benefits than previously realized. In determining countable income in the Food Stamp program, there is a standard deduction and a deduction for housing expenses, which exceed 50 percent of income.
5 Seven out of ten AFDC-TANF families get such a shelter deduction. The shelter deduction raises the amount of benefits a state can provide without losing Food Stamp dollars, but it also increases the rate at which Food Stamps are reduced when cash benefits are increased. I calculate that states must raise cash benefits by $1.60 to increase an AFDC recipient's income by a dollar, while for SSI, the price of state supplements is 1.69. Moreover, the price tends to be higher in low-income states.
In estimations of the effect of Food Stamps on AFDC benefits, I find that both the lump-sum effect of changes in the maximum benefit and the price effect of the Food Stamp implicit tax are substantial. These results must be regarded as ten-tative, because even with the excess shelter cost taken into account, there is still not much variation in the measured Food Stamp price. However, if the findings do hold up to further testing, they suggest a displacement-based explanation for the decline in AFDC matching rate effects. Because the Food Stamp maximum benefit is uniform, if all states respond to an increase in the Food Stamp benefit with the same absolute reduction in cash benefits, there will be a greater percentage decrease in benefits in states with lower benefits initially. Furthermore, the Food Stamp price is higher for states with high federal matching rates, thus providing a greater offset to the matching incentive in these states. 6 The disproportionate effect of Food Stamps in low benefit states helps to offset the spending incentive from more favorable matching rates. If this reasoning is correct, as long as Food Stamps remains the basic national safety-net program, we can expect matching rate elasticities for cash benefits to be small and insignificant.
Medicaid
There have been fewer studies of the matching rate elasticity of Medicaid benefits than of AFDC. Granneman (1983) found an elasticity of 0.78 using data from 1977 to 1980. I find price elasticities of about 0.65 for the period 1983-95 (Chernick, 1999b) . I also find a strong positive cross-price elasticity between cash benefits and Medicaid spending on AFDC recipients, indicating that Food Stamps induces states to substitute Medicaid benefits for cash assistance. This result is consistent with Craig (1993) , who finds that the savings that states realize by substituting Food Stamps for cash benefits remain disproportionate within state welfare budgets and are used to leverage federal dollars through an increase in state matching dollars for Medicaid. Not surprisingly, I find that the cross-price effects are much weaker between Food Stamps and the larger category of non-AFDC Medicaid spending (spending for the disabled and the elderly).
One reason for the dramatic expansion in Medicaid in the late 1980s was a series of mandates to expand coverage to include more low-income families. Based on U.S. Census of Governments data on total welfare spending, Baicker (1999a) has argued that states' fiscal response to these mandates was to cut back on other welfare spending by an amount almost exactly equal to the extra cost of the mandates. This result, if correct, suggests that the national government is highly constrained in its ability to force states to expand coverage and increase spending on the needy.
An alternative explanation for the Baicker result is that states did not actually reduce spending in the other welfare categories, but mainly relabeled and transferred spending to Medicaid so as to be able to qualify for federal matching. In allowing this Medicaid maximization, the federal government implicitly reduced the net cost of the mandates, by enabling states to leverage more of their own welfare spending with federal matching dollars. Unfortunately, the Census of Governments classifications of welfare spending are too aggregated to allow us to resolve this question, and we lack sufficiently detailed and consistent state data on other categories of social service spending, such as child protective services, to determine the extent to which Medicaid mandates were accompanied by an actual drop in other welfare services, as opposed to a shift in funding streams.
The period of most rapid expansion in Medicaid spending, from 1988 to 1993, also saw a dramatic increase in special Medicaid financing devices such as provider taxes (levied only on medical institutions) and intergovernmental transfers, say from a state department of mental health to its Medicaid department.
7 These devices allowed states to obtain additional Medicaid funds under a category known as "disproportionate share" funds, with little increase in their own fiscal effort. Thus, the Medicaid financing went from an open-ended matching program to a combination of matching and lump-sum dollars. One way to interpret the disproportionate share funds is that they were provided to states, with the approval of Congress, as compensation for the cost of the new Medicaid mandates (Miller, no date) . If this interpretation is correct, it suggests that the intergovernmental fiscal relationship is more subtle than simply setting a matching price and specifying eligible expenditures. Rather, it involves continuous bargaining over fiscal terms, with the federal government willing to adjust fiscal incentives to achieve new objectives. It also suggests that to model the effects of federal grants on state spending, we must pay careful attention to the way in which the fiscal relationship between the grantor and the grantee evolves over time.
Policy Implications
The main conclusion of this review is that fiscal incentives matter in determining state spending on the needy. However, cross-program effects are as important as own price and income effects, and it is necessary to consider the entire array of incentives in understanding states' fiscal behavior.
What are the implications of these findings for the long-run effect of the 1996 welfare reform legislation? First, over an intermediate period that could last as long as ten years, the fiscal effect of converting grants for cash assistance from matching to lump sum will not be very great. However, if my hypothesis is correct, the reason for the lack of response is not that matching per se doesn't matter, but rather that the federal Food Stamp program, which functions like a block grant for food, combined with a strong negative price incentive for cash benefits, had already largely offset the cashgrant matching incentive. From this point of view, the Food Stamp program has acted to discourage rather than encourage fiscal cooperation between states and the federal government in the provision of cash assistance. However, even this pattern of noncooperation must be qualified by the finding that a substantial portion of state savings from cash assistance go into state Medicaid spending.
In terms of timing, because the block grants provided a fiscal windfall to states, and most state economies have been strong in the past few years, absent a deep recession, even the limited price response observed in the past will not be manifested for some time. More specifically, the end of matching grants will not be sufficient to kick off the "race to the bottom" in state benefits levels, which some have predicted. While the sharp decline in welfare caseloads since the introduction of the TANF block grant is consistent with the increase in the marginal cost of cash assistance, factors such as the robust economy and the end of the entitlement obligation itself have been more important in explaining this drop (Blank and Wallace, 1999; Figlio and Ziliak, 1999) .
Because TANF increases the marginal price of cash assistance relative to Food Stamps, we might expect states to accelerate the shift from cash assistance to Food Stamps. So far this substitution has not been observed, as both TANF and Food Stamp caseloads have been moving down largely in tandem. Does this mean that the fiscal substitution responses identified in the past are no longer relevant under the new laws? Clearly, the broad changes in the law, and perhaps even broader societal changes in the ideology of welfare, mean the ceteris paribus assumption of changes in fiscal incentives alone does not hold. My own view is that eventually the change in fiscal incentives will come to matter, as states perceive and respond to the even greater fiscal advantages than before of substituting Food Stamps for cash. However, this substitution will occur from a new and lower equilibrium level of recipiency in both programs. If Food Stamp benefits or access were to be cut further than they were in the 1996 welfare reform law, the displacement argument also suggests that eventually states would replace at least a part of the decrease in federal benefits. However, the lesson from the literature on welfare grants-in-aid is that it takes considerable time for states to reach a new fiscal equilibrium in response to changes in fiscal incentives, and needy persons would be forced to endure a long period of reduced resources before states moved in to address the problem.
In contrast to the results on cash assistance, estimates from the Medicaid literature suggest a strong price response to federal matching subsidies. The implication is that efforts to cap Medicaid, or convert it to a block grant, would lead to very large reductions in Medicaid spending. Mandates to expand coverage under Medicaid, coupled with the price subsidy through federal matching, appear to have been effective at achieving their purpose. However, examination of other categories of welfare spending suggest either that the additional spending required by the mandates has come from reducing other categories of welfare spending or that the federal government has been forced to sweeten the fiscal incentive by tacitly adding a lump-sum component to the Medicaid matching grant.
To return to the question that motivated this essay, in our federalist system, can the federal government use fiscal incentives to induce the states to cooperate in achieving redistributional goals? The answer is a limited yes. To be effective, fiscal incentives must be not only strong but also consistent across the entire array of programs. If one program implicitly taxes another, or offers more favorable fiscal terms, as has been the case for Food Stamps vs cash assistance, states will respond by substituting in favor of the cheaper program. A related question is whether the federal government can save money and still expand services by substituting mandates for fiscal incentives? The tentative lesson from the Medicaid program is that it cannot. If the national level wishes to induce subnational fiscal cooperation in expanding services to the needy, mandates must be combined with more generous fiscal incentives. This lesson appears to have been applied to the new Child Health Insurance Program, which provides a more generous federal matching rate than the Medicaid matching program.
